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CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE*

International Codes and Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Update and
Selected Issues
It is well known that over the past decade there have been moves from
many quarters to establish international codes and guidelines to regulate
internationally the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The
major organizations involved in such efforts are the United Nations, including the Secretariat (Economic and Social Council and the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations) and U.N.-related agencies (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International
Labour Office); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and the International Chamber of Commerce. The concentrated
efforts by such international bodies as these to devise operable international
instruments are clear evidence of the universal concern in this regard.
The intent of the present article is, after a general review of the current
status of the major codes and guidelines, to consider the merits of divergent
views on their legal character, the balance of rights and obligations established by the actual formulation of the provisions, and some observations
on achieving the commonly held and expressed intent of eliminating abuses
and preserving benefits of MNE activity through such international instruments as are currently in operation or under formulation. The article ends
with an evaluation of what MNE-related regulations should accomplish
and an appraisal of what are properly national functions and what are more
suitably international functions in accomplishing those ends.

Deputy Assistant Director, International Law Institute, Georgetown University Law
Center. Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise: National Regulatory Techniques and the
Prospectsfor InternationalControls, by Dr. Cynthia Day Wallace, is published by Martinus
Nijhoff, the Netherlands (1982).
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A. Overview of Major Current Efforts at International Codes and
Guidelines
Of signal importance regarding the major international efforts at regulating MNE activity is that each group is fully cognizant of the others' work,
and while a certain amount of overlap and parallel effort is inevitable, there
is, for the most part, an attempt to avoid duplication. Evidence of this
mutual awareness is recorded in the preamble to the Tripartite Declaration
of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, of the
International Labour Office (ILO Declaration) which expressly acknowledges having been "informed of the activities of other international bodies,
in particular the UN. Commission on Transnational Corporations and the
• . . OECD". 2 The two particular endeavors thus singled out by the ILO
preamble still represent the two major guideline 'packages' receiving the
greatest attention by the international community in current MNE/home/
host dialogue.
1. The United Nations family oackage' and related efforts
The earliest U.N.-initiated studies began in the International Labour
Office (ILO), a "specialized agency" (or "related agency") within the U.N.
family. Specialized agencies have an independent status, and ILO studies
on the impact of MNEs began well in advance of those by the U.N. Secretariat. These studies culminated in the ILO Declaration which was adopted
in November 1977. The ILO Declaration deals strictly with those aspects of
MNE conduct that relate to social policy in general and labour relations in
particular, and already appears in its entirety as an Annex to a U.N.
ECOSOC document concerning the U.N. Code of Conduct, 3 thus indicating the close interaction of the two. This close association is further underlined by the decision that the following text, formulated during discussions
on the U.N. draft Code, was to be incorporated in one of the substantive
introductory sections of the U.N. Code:
For the purposes of this Code, the principles set out in the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, should apply
in the field
of employment, training, conditions of work and life and industrial
4
relations.
'International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS, Vol.

XVII, No. 2, March 1978, [hereinafter cited as ILO Declaration].
2
lbid, at 423.
3
United Nations, ECOSOC, "Transnational Corporations: Texts Relevant to an Annotated
Outline Suggested by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Code of
Conduct", Report of the Secretariat of the Commission on Transnational Corporations, Intergovernmental Working Group of the Whole on the Code of Conduct, Third Session, New
York, 6-10 February 1978, U.N. Document No. E/C.10/AC.2/3 (January 26, 1978), Annex II.
"United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations", U.N. Document E/C.10/1982/6 of June 5, 1982, Annex,
note I [hereinafter cited as U.N. Draft Code].
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Direct reference to the ILO Declaration is also made in paragraph 46 of the
Code.
While the U.N. Code, not yet in its definitive form, may indeed make
such references to the ILO Declaration, the drafters of the Code are effectively precluded-for practical purposes-from actually incorporating the
lengthy Declaration into its text, due to the ILO's request in its letter of
transmittal to the U.N. that the Declaration "neither be altered nor reproduced in parts only". 5
The U.N. Code of Conduct itselfP is being formulated by a specially
appointed Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct as an
undertaking of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, 7
itself a subsidiary organ ("advisory body") of ECOSOC, and with the substantive support of the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations which
functions as Secretariat to the Commission. The "Completion of the Formulation of the Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations", 8 resulting from a special session of the Commission on Transnational
Corporations in March and May of this year, reflects the current status of
the Code which remains in draft form. This "final draft", after consideration by ECOSOC, will be transmitted to the U.N. General Assembly at its
thirty-eighth session in September for consideration and appropriate action.
There are some major outstanding issues in the various parts of the Code,
notable among which is the issue of compensation for expropriations and
nationalizations manifesting the unresolved divergence of views among
delegations.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), classified as a "subsidiary organ" of the U.N. but with "autonomous" functions, has established an Intergovernmental Group which has
already gone some way in drafting a code of conduct on the transfer of
technology (ToT). 9 The latest stages of these negotiations are being carried
"'Letter of transmittal by the ILO Deputy Director-Genesal to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations regarding the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy", November 16, 1977, reprinted in Commission on Transnational Corporations, "Texts Relevant to an Annotated Outline", Annex II (Doc. E/C. 10/
AC.2/3, January 26, 1978, at 2).
'U.N. Draft Code, op. cit., supra note 4.
'Established by unanimous U.N. ECOSOC resolution 1913 (LVII) (E/RES/1913 (LVII)) of
December 5, 1974. See also "Auf dem Weg zu einem Verhaltenskodex ffir Multis: Tagung der
Uno-Kommission fttr
transnationale Gesellschaften", Neue ZarcherZeitung, May 30, 1979, at
10.
"'United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Information Paper on the
Negotiations to Complete the Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations", Commission
On Transnational Corporations, Special Session, 7-18 March and 9-10 May 1983, U.N. document E/C. 10/1983/S/2 of January 4, 1983.
'See "Draft international code of conduct on the transfer of technology: Present position",
prepared by the Legal Policies Section of the Technology Division, UNCTAD, Geneva, The
CTC Reporter, No. 12, Summer 1982, pp. 32-34; also "UNCTAD V Ends Session in Manila,
UNCTAD Information Unit, UNCTAD Document No. TAD/INF/1079 of June 5, 1979, at
2,14. See also UNCTAD Document No. TD/L.173 and subsequent related documents.
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on by an Interim Committee which has been meeting several times a year
since March 1982.
Some fundamental points of disaccord within the UNCTAD group continue to delay completion of the ToT code. '0 Among the issues still lacking
consensus are several of considerable significance-namely, scope of application, applicable law and settlement of disputes, and restrictive practices.
Despite some potential overlap with the U.N. draft Code, I the Intergovernmental Working Group plans to incorporate the UNCTAD ToT code
into the Code of Conduct in one manner or another. It has not yet been
decided whether such incorporation should follow the ILO formula mentioned above, or whether another mode of reference should be adopted.
Two alternative proposals have been drafted: one contains "minimal substantive provisions in the area concerned in addition to a special reference
incorporating the provisions of the particular instrument in question", and
the other providing only that the "relevant provisions of the said instrument
12
should apply for the purposes of the Code."'
Incorporated in like manner (when that manner is determined) into the
U.N. Code will be the UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 35/63 of 5 December
1980,13 as well as the ECOSOC international agreement on illicit payments,' 4 still under consideration. The UNCTAD Set of Principles and
Rules was elaborated by the United Nations Conference on Restrictive
Business Practices convened' 5 under the auspices of UNCTAD, and was
based on the work of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive
Trade Practices. It has been remarked' 6 that although the Principles and
Rules are described as "multilaterally agreed", they were adopted without
vote, and still contain some wide areas of disagreement between representatives of the major economic groups involved. One of the main stated objec7
tives is the "creation, encouragement and protection of competition";'
other objectives include "control of the concentration of capital and wealth,
promotion of social welfare and consumer interests, and benefits to the
'°UNCTAD Document No. TAD/INF/1079, op. cit., supra note 9, (unnumbered) para. 1,
at 2; (unnumbered) paras. 1-5, at 14.
"Ibid., (unnumbered) para. 9, at 13.
' 2United Nations, op. cit., supra note 8, para. 55.
"UNCTAD Document No. TD/RBP/CONF/10, Annex; U.N. document A/C.2/35/6 of
23 4October 1980.
' United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental
Working Group on the Problem of CorruptPracticesin InternationalCommercial Transactions,
Sixty-third Session, Agenda item 17: Transnational Corporations, U.N. document E/6006 of 5
July 1977. See also infra notes 21-23.
"Convened by resolution 33/153 of December 20, 1978.
"Gill, "The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code. A Codefor Competition?", 13
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER (1979), at 607.

" Krishnamurti, "The Set ofMultilaterallyAgreedEquitablePrinciplesand Rulesfor the Control of Restrictive Business Practices", THE CTC REPORTER, No. 11,Spring 1982, at 33.
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trade and development of developing countries."' 8 Some regard the Principles and Rules, however, as less of a code for competitive practices than as
a tactical step on the part of the developing countries to restrain competition from foreign private international business and to aid in the campaign
for the New International Economic Order.19 The formulators themselves
have no hesitation in declaring the importance of the Principles and Rules
to the realization of one of the objectives of the New International Economic Order or in discussing the demands of the developing countries for
preferential treatment and increased bargaining power. 20 A realization of
the aims of the instrument will depend to some extent on its implementation which has been entrusted to a Committee on Restrictive Business Practices set up within UNCTAD, with comprehensive terms of reference.
Moreover, governments have agreed to submit annual reports on related
issues and on their own compliance with the Principles and Rules. The
latter will also be reviewed for possibilities of improvement by a United
Nations Conference at the end of five years (1985).
As regards the ECOSOC international agreement on illicit payments also
referred to above as destined for some manner of incorporation into the
U.N. draft Code, specific action is in abeyance pending a decision by either
the U.N. General Assembly or ECOSOC that further action be pursued. A
Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments was established by a 1978 decision of ECOSOC. 2 1 By 1979 the Committee had met
in two sessions and submitted a report2 2 to ECOSOC which in turn formulated two draft resolutions and transmitted them to the General Assembly
together with the Committee's report. Since the General Assembly, on consideration of the draft resolutions, agreed to take no action on them at that
time, 23 further progress has been delayed.
Taking into account all these various efforts and achievements among the
sundry members of the U.N. family, they may safely be said, on the whole,
to represent a unified effort.
The International Chamber of Commerce-the first to produce guidelines, which appeared in 1972 as the ICC Guidelines for International
Investment (ICC Guidelines)--has kept close watch on the formuation of
the U.N. Code and has had an appreciable influence upon it. In fact, this
'input' function into the U.N. Code is one of the stated purposes of the ICC
Guidelines, 24 and the ICC has consequently submitted its views periodi'81bid
"U.N. General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI) [1974].
"°See Krishnamurti, op. cit., supra note 17, at 33.
"See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1978 Supplement No. I (E/1978/
78), resolution 1978/71.
""Report of the Committee on an International Agreement of Illicit Payments on its first
and second sessions" (E/1979/104).
"U.N.
document A/34/635/Add.3, para. 9.
24
International Chamber of Commerce, Guidelines for International Investment, ICC Publications, Paris, 1974, [hereinafter cited as ICC Guidelines], (unnumbered) paras. 5, 9, at 7, 8.
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cally to the United Nations throughout the course of the latter's work on the
Code.
The EEC and other regional and international bodies have also expressly
been supplying input into the U.N. Code formulations. The EEC has an
advantage over the international organizations in that, within the limits of
its legislative and enforcement jurisdiction, it has the authority to enact
legally binding codes and to enforce compliance. 25 The EEC however has,
up to now, as regards actual codes for MNEs, confined itself to activities of
a recommendatory nature directed at the U.N. formulations, rather than

utilizing its greater legal competence to initiate a separate effort at codifying
MNE controls. Moreover, the EEC policy toward MNEs, once an entity is
allowed entry into the community, is one of nondiscrimination. Legislative

initiatives, most of those affecting MNEs being in the form of "directives",
will most likely have an effect on MNE operations, but are not specifically
directed at such enterprises. Hence, the EEC will undoubtedly leave MNE

code-drafting to those bodies already engaged in these activities.
2. The OECD 'Package'
The one international organization which most clearly stands out as
independent from the United Nations group and related efforts is the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
which adpoted, in June 1976, its Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 26 along with four other
instruments relating to the Declaration. Three of these related instruments
are "Decisions" (on intergovernmental consultation procedures; on
national treatment; and on international investment incentives and disincentives), 27 and the other is the "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises"

(OECD Guidelines), formally an Annex to the Declaration. 28
Interestingly enough, this "integrated package", comprised of the five

MNE-related instruments, comprehends three distinct legal categories 29
25

See e.g. Bowett, The Law of InternationalInstitutions (London: Stevens, 3d ed., 1975), at
185-189.
2
1Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Declaration
by the
Governments of OECD Member Countriesand Decisions of the OECD Council on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Paris, 11976], [hereinafter cited as OECD
Declaration].
17Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Decisions of the
Council on
Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinationals"; "Decision of the Council on National Treatment"; and "Decision of the Council on International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives", in Idem.
"'Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" [hereinafter cited as OECD Guidelines], Annex, OECD Declaration, loc.
cit., supra note 26.
"See Baade, "Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey",
background paper for the International Symposium on Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct
for Multinational Enterprises, sponsored by the Zentrunm fAr interdisziplinare Forschung der
Universitat Bielefeld, July 16-18, 1979, at 38-39. Published as Hans W. Baade, Codes of Conductfor MultinationalEnterprises.An Introductory Survey, in: Norbert Horn and E.R. Lanier
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represented in (1) the Decisions, which, according to the OECD Convention, 30 are legally binding on all participating members (Article 5); (2) the
Declaration, which, along with some member-state "considerations and
understandings" prefacing the Guidelines, is not legally binding by virtue
of the OECD treaty itself, but could be considered to be so in any aspect in
which it expresses in convenient and systematic form some existing rule of
general international law, or could become so by incorporation into a treaty
duly ratified by OECD member states; and (3) the Guidelines, which are
expressly stated within their own framework to be "not legally enforceable"
(paragraph 6).
In 1979, OECD Ministers reviewed the Declaration and Decisions and
reaffirmed their Governments' commitment to the 1976 Declaration, while
at the same time making substantive and explanatory additions to the
Guidelines. In 1982, a Mid-Term-Report 3' was drawn up on the 1976 Declaration and Decisions and related work. For the most part, the issues were
limited to clarifying the text of the Guidelines, relating to matters on both
the national and international levels. The next full review of the instruments is scheduled for 1984.
B. Nature of International Codes and Guidelines
1. Legal aspects
A. NON-LEGALLY-BINDING

CHARACTER

The most pertinent common feature of all the codes and guidelines is
their non-legally-binding character. Those which do not expressly state
their non-legally-binding nature clearly acknowledge it. The two exceptions are those codes still in the drafting stage, namely, the draft U.N. Code,
for which, even after exhaustive discussions by the Intergovernmental
Working Group, the question has been deferred to the concluding phase of
the negotiations and is still outstanding; 32 and the yet-to-be-completed
UNCTAD code on the transfer of technology, 33 for which a mandate in the
(eds.), Legal Problems of Codes of Conductfor MultinationalEnterprises (Frankfurt: Kluwer,
1980), Vol I [hereinafter cited as "Codes of Conduct"].
'Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development of December 14, 1960.
"See Fahri, "The OECD and TNCs. Recent Activities", THE CTC REPORTER, No. 14, Win-

ter 1983, at 55.
"United Nations, op. cit., supra note 8, para. 26.
"Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, United Nations document TD/CODE TOT/25 of June 2, 1980. It has been suggested that the UNCTAD code, if
promulgated, could have certain model-law implications for those countries which have no
law on the subject, or that such countries insist, administratively, that technology transfers to
their country be in accordance with the code. (See Davidow, "The UNCTAD Restrictive
Business Practices Code", InternationalLawyer, (1979), at 603.) See also Fikentscher, The
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, published by the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law,
Munich (Weinheim: Chemie, 1980).
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preamble reserves the questions of legal character and implementation for
later consideration.
There are two basic positions regarding this issue. One is known as the
"maximalist position", and favours legally binding, internationally enforceable rules of conduct for MNEs. This position is adhered to generally by
the international trade union movement and the developing nations. The
other is the so-called "minimalist position", and promotes the notion of
voluntary rather than legally enforceable guidelines. This position is predictably advocated by the international business community and generally
by highly capital-intensive industrialized nations. 34 Between these two
poles is what has been termed a "zebra code", i.e., an instrument composed
of both binding 36and nonbinding rules, 35 containing both "shall" and
"should" clauses. Such an instrument, it has been suggested, may find its
way into customary international law, or even already be considered as a
restatement thereof in certain of its provisions, particularly those addressed
to states and phrased in legal terms. 37 This is still, however, somewhat
speculative, so we shall concentrate here on the two major positions-"minimalist" and "maximalist"-mentioned above. What are the prospects for
the two positions?
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE "MINIMALIST POSITION"

To support the institution of a universally applicable, legally binding
international control system is to ignore the fact that not all governments on
the one hand, nor all corporations on the other hand, share identical aims
or interests, or even identical concerns. The acknowledgement of a fundamental divergency of political ideologies and economic policies is essential
for an understanding of the nature and function of present or prospective
international guidelines.
These disparities are universally recognized and need little elaboration,
other than perhaps to point out that the problem lies not so much in differing long-range economic objectives between the developing and industrialized world, as in their immediate objectives, or, perhaps more significantly,
simply in the fact that economic, political and sociological consequences
arising out of business transactions among the developed nations, where
considerable equilibrium exists between incoming and outgoing direct
investment, are significantly different from those arising out of economic
activities between the developed and the developing nations. It is generally
recognized that these two categories of investment activity require separate
"4See Baade, "Codes of Conduct", op. cit., supra note 29, at 56.
"See e.g. Baade, "The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MultinationalEnterprises", 22
GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979), at II et seq. [hereinafter cited as "Legal
Effects of Codes"].
'See e.g., the Convention on a Code for Liner Conferences drafted under the auspices of
UNCTAD, United Nations General Assembly resolution 3035 (XXVII), December 19, 1972.
3'See Baade, "Legal Effects of Codes", op. cit., supra note 35, at 24.
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treatment. An ICC spokesman, addressing the United Nations, summed up
the situation thus:
Any 'Code of Conduct for transnational corporations' should not be binding,
since the diversity of38national situations makes it impossible to apply uniform
rules to all countries.

It is this very lack of uniformity of interests and intrinsic incompatibility of
existing economic systems, along with the divergent levels or stages of
industrialization and development (a) between different economic regions,

(b) between individual states within those regions, and (c) even internal to
the individual state itself at various stages in its development, that are perhaps the greatest and most obvious obstacles to any legally binding, globally applicable international regulatory agreement.
Separate consideration of these distinctions both between economic sys-

tems and different stages of development is no new notion. It was to be
seen in the UNCTAD V meeting in 1979 where participants were divided
into distinct regional or economic groupings; 39 it was to be seen in the nongovernmental Dilsseldorf Conference on Multinational Corporations where
one panel discussed problems of investment control between developed
nations while another simultaneously considered relations between developed and less-developed nations; it is to be seen in UNCTAD resolution 21
41
(11)40 and in U.N. General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV), paragraph
32, where the notion of nonreciprocal preferential arrangements for developing countries 42 is advanced-as it is throughout the EC Lom6 Convention, and in the GATT Tokyo Round 4 3 and UNCTAD V Session4-to
make special provision for the least developed and developing countries in
an attempt, over the long term, to narrow the development gap between
them and the developed states.
It is not only differing stages of economic development, but also fundamentally differing ideologies among nations and groups of nations which
3
1,"Multinationals:

ICC Speaks to UN Session in Peru", ICC Bulletin, International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, March 1976, at 3.
"These groupings consisted of an "African Group", an "Asian Group", a "Latin American
Group", a "Group B" (representing the western market-economy nations), a "Group D" (representing the soviet-bloc, state-run economies), and China.
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, resolution 21(11), March 26, 1968
(Proceedingsof the UnitedNations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, Vol.
I and Corr. I & 3 and Add. I & 2, Report and Annexes, [United Nations publication, Sales No.
E 68 11,D 14]), at 38.
"'United Nations G.A. resolution 2626 (XXV), November 11, 1970.
'21n para. 56(5), a further distinction is made by granting special measures in favour of the
"least developed" among the developing nations, reflecting the earlier UNCTAD resolution
21(11) and its related documents.
4'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Document No. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2. ("Different and more favourable treatment for developing countries, reciprocity by developing
countries in trade negotiations, and their progressive fuller participation in GATT".)
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Provisional Agenda for the
Fifth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development", UNCTAD Document TD/220, April 12, 1979, [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD V Provisional Agenda], at 4.
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further serve to frustrate a meeting of the minds. Clearly, state-run economies are based upon a substantially different set of principles than are economies founded and run on a free-enterprise principle. In Eastern Europe,
for example, the MNE can operate as such only in three states: Yugoslavia,
Rumania and Hungary45 (and only within certain specified limitations).
The USSR itself, along with other communist-bloc countries, 46 has made
ever-increasing use of the joint-venture-in partnership with state or private capital-as a means of entering the world market; yet even this limited
entry by the Soviets into a wider economic system through the joint venture
was publicly reproached as "revisionist" in a Press Release at the United
Nations in 1975-by the People's Republic of China, which significantly
labelled such associations as "Moscow-brand 'transnational corporations' -. 47 Interestingly enough, China has since adopted its own law on
joint ventures: "The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment", 48 and has ceased attacking
Soviet economic policy as "revisionist". An interesting notion has been
expounded by one author who writes:
In one respect the enterprises within each Communist country can be viewed as
one giant conglomerate enterprise directed at the top by political-economic unity
of command. In Russia it could be called the USSR enterprise. And it is multinational in that its joint activities dovetail with other Communist country enterprises and,49 increasingly with Japan, Arab, African and other national
enterprises.
This, of course, is one rather novel interpretation, but is indeed intriguing.
Realistically, given the general Communist view, any reconciliation
between the state-run-economy concept and that of the industrialized western free-economy states leading to a uniform approach to international regulation is even more illusory than an agreement aspiring to solve the
"Hellmann, "Countervailing Powers to the Multinational Corporation", in WALLACE, ed.,
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT:

THE DOSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON MULTINA-

TIONAL CORPORATIONS (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), at 59. But see Machowski,
"Multinationale Unternehmen sozialistischer Lander", Neue Zilrcher Zeitung, May 15, 1979,
at 10.
'See e.g. the Bulgarian Law on Joint Ventures of 25 March 1980 (English translation),
published in 19 International Legal Materials (1980), pp. 992-1002.
"Press Release, People's Republic of China, United Nations, September 9, 1975. It will be

interesting to witness the further development of the Chinese attitude in these matters in view
of the recent policy changes by the Chinese Government.
"The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1,
1979. Reproduced in 13 International Legal Materials, (1979), from the Be6iing Review, No. 29
(July 20, 1979), at 24-26. The Beiing Review text of the Law was also distributed in Press
Release No. 79/001 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China at Washington, D.C.
See also "Gesetzentwtlrfe in chinesischen Volkskongress", Frankfurter AIgemeine Zeitung,
June 28, 1979, at 3. See also Torkert, "China's Joint Venture Law. A Preliminary Analysis", 12
VAND. J. TRANS. L. (1979), pp. 819-895.
"TINDALL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND
INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, ANTITRUST, LABOR, TAXATION AND DIsCLOSURE, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1975), at 238.
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investment problems of both the developed and developing states under
identical provisions.
This economic and socio-ideological division has been further aggravated by the existence of a certain resistance on the part of the developing
world and Soviet bloc against international law in general, which they are
inclined to see as a tool of the industrialized nations which they correctly
see as having interests different to their own. Evidence of this can be seen
in the outcome and conclusions of the DUsseldorf Conference mentioned
above where, ironically enough, both economic sectors arrived at similar
conclusions (negatively disposed toward international controls) but for
entirely different reasons. A Report on the Conference contains the observation that:
•.. the less developed nations would seem to fear that the international agency
would seek to restrain their actions in regard to the foreign-based MNEs. And
this attitude neatly balances the worry of business that any international agency
would rather fetter than free the MNE. 50

It has been largely subsequent to the DUsseldorf Conference that the
developing world, led by international labour, has begun to adhere most
strongly to the "maximalist" position, since many of the codes and guidelines which have appeared during that period have clearly favoured their
interests. It could be argued that those parties favouring the "minimalist
position" (non-legally-binding controls) are, themselves, doing so out of
self-interest, but they have the advantage that the above facts regarding
disunity among economic and ideological systems lend strong support to
their position.
Those developing states most concerned about the loss of sovereignty
have at least had the insight, as evidenced by the excerpt above from the
Report of the Dtsseldorf Conference, not to lose sight of the fact that-as
EEC member-states have already experienced-a certain loss of sovereignty is necessarily involved in the application of any binding agreement
enforced by an international or even by a regional body. Those states have
rightly realized that international regulations can be as much of a compromise of sovereignty-or more so-as the commercial activities of foreign
multinationals, which at least are subject to host-state regulation.
The fact remains that, for the present, at least, there exists no legally
binding agreement. Moreover, the general consensus, as reflected in the
results of both governmental and nongovernmental congresses, symposia
and other international convocations, as well as in the relevant legal literature and academic evaluations and assessments, is that actual universally
applicable and legally enforceable international ccdes are simply not feasible in the present economic and political environment--an environment
which shows no immediate promise of becoming more amenable to uni'Rubin, "Report on the DasseldorfConference on InternationalControls on Foreign Invest-

ment", 7 INTERNATIONAL

LAWYER

(1973), at 826-827.
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form treatment. Hence, for the time being and the foreseeable future, the

"minimalist" position prevails.

C. PROSPECTS FOR THE "MAXIMALIST POSITION"

The "maximalists", aware that there is little hope of a general international treaty to give the codes legal stature, are looking to other possible
sources of international law to enhance the juridical status of their position.
This has led to the promotion, almost exclusively by those interests adhering to the maximalist position, of the view that the U.N. Code, at least, and

certainly the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, may already
be considered--or may over a (perhaps short) period of time come to be
considered--customary international law.5 1
Predictably there is resistance to this view on the part of most industrialized states which tend repeatedly to refer to the voluntary nature of the

Code. Further, with regard to the Economic Charter, as a U.N. General
Assembly resolution, there would be strong objection on the part of the
same nations, on account of the "one-state-one-vote" principle in the U.N.
General Assembly, to construing resolutions by that body as any sort of
52
'international legislation".
A most cogent and compelling argument regarding the customary international law question as regards U.N. resolutions was elaborated in the
53
1977 Arbitral Award of Dupuy in the Texaco and Calasiaticv. Libya case
before the International Court of Justice, in the context of the compensation
question in expropriation cases. In his reasoning, Dupuy supported the
customary international law nature of the 1962 U.N. resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which contains an international
law reference in its compensation clause, while rejecting any international
legal status of later resolutions, such as the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 54 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 55 which "as a practical matter rule out
" For some contemporary views on the complexities of proving a "rule" has become custom,
see generally, D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press (1971), esp. pp. 41-44, 233-236, 246-263, 269-274; THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972), esp. Chapter Four.
2See e.g. Tomuschat, "Die Charta der wirtschaftlichen Rechte und Pflichten der Staaten.
Zur Gestaltungskraft von Deklarationen der UN-Generalversammlung." "The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. A New Legal Order of World Economy?" (Summary),
in Mosler, ed., 36 Vldkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, ZeitschriftfAlr auslindisches qffent/iches Recht
und VdIkerrecht (1976), at 491. For further comment on the resolutions and declarations of
the United Nations General Assembly as a "legislative" activity, see Thirlway, op. cit., supra
note 51, at 61-79.
"Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic (Award on the Merits, 19 January 1977), 53 INTERNATIONAL LAW
REPORTS, at 389 et seq. (translated from the original French).
'U.N. General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI), op. cit., supra note 1.
"United Nations, Official Records ofthe GeneralAssembly. 29th Session (1974), Vol. 1: Resolutions (Supp. No. 31 (A/963 1), United Nations, New York, 1975 hereinafter cited as United
Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
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confer an exclusive and unlim-

ited competence upon the legislation and courts of the host country."'56 He
makes this distinction on the basis of an examination of the circumstances
under which the resolutions were adopted and an analysis of the provisions
and principles which they embody. It is thus noted that the majority vote
which favoured the text of the 1962 resolution evidenced the assent of a
great many states, representing all geographic areas and all economic systems, 57 and that this broad consensus was felt to be directly attributable to
the inclusion in the text of two references to international law, in particular
in the field of nationalization. 58
This could not be said of the later resolutions, which were supported by a
majority of U.N. member states, none of which were those industrialized
market-economy states which engage in the largest amount of foreign direct
investment activity. 59 These later resolutions were characterized by serious
disagreements between representatives of different economic and political
sectors, and since the absence of any intrinsically binding force of U.N.
General Assembly resolutions implies that a general consensus by member
states is a prerequisite to establishing any possible "customary" legally
binding nature, it is clear that a majority vote, unmitigated by reservations
such as those made by a large number of industrialized states in connection
with some of the above amendments, must be representative of all political
and economic groups. Moreover, it must be emphasized that even a majority vote representative of all political and economic groups does not of
course create international law, though it may represent a codification or
proclamation of rules recognized by the community of nations. In other
words, it may confirm a custom "by formulating it and specifying its
scope."' 60 Or as expressed by Ambassador Castafteda, who was Chairman
of the Working Group preparing the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, such resolutions "do not create the law; they have a declar6
atory nature of noting what does exist." '
Hence, while the 1962 resolution 1803 (XVII) seemed to Dupuy to reflect
the state of customary law existing in this field, 62 he could not regard the
Charter, and other relevant resolutions relating compensation to the municipal law standard, as anything other than "a de legeferenda formulation,

"Ibid, para. 82, at 485.
"Ibid., para. 84, at 487. This resolution was passed in the General Assembly by 87 votes to
2, with 12 abstentions. It should be noted that the two negative votes were those of developed
countries, viz. France and South Africa, and that the abstentions were on the part of Soviet
bloc countries. However, as there is exclusively state ownership in the Soviet bloc in any case,
nationalization with compensation is not an issue for that group.
8
bid, para. 84, at 488.
"'Ibid, para. 86, at 491.
'lbid, para. 86, at 491.
"Ibid, para. 87, at 491.
2
Ibid, para. 87, at 492.
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which even appears contra legem in the eyes of many developed
63
countries.
While the developing states have favoured the exclusion of an international law standard as regards the compensation issue, they have at the
same time generally favoured, from the drafters' earliest sessions, the view
that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States should be a legal
instrument with binding force. There are those 64 who see as inconsistent a
position which, on the one hand, advocates a new regime of binding rules
of international law applicable to the conduct of multinational enterprises,
while on the other hand insisting that only the national law of the host state
shall apply to expropriation, with no reference to international law standards. The question arises as to whether it is acceptable to exclude international law from one aspect of an issue while invoking it in related aspects of
the same issue.
This only serves to underline the complexity and controversial nature of
the question of custom as it relates to U.N. resolutions in general, and those
at issue here in particular.
Whatever the case, the fact that U.N. General Assembly resolutions lack
any intrinsically binding force implies that a general consensus by member
states is a basic prerequisite to even contemplating any customary international legal nature of such resolutions. And should a resolution become
custom, it is, in any case, not binding on dissenting states. The MNEs
themselves, by compliance with the codes or guidelines, are clearly incapable of thereby transforming them into customary international law, owing
to their lack of full international legal personality. 65 Given these facts, and
given the fact that 'custom' can become international law only in the
absence of protest, reservations expressed by a number of highly industrialized states to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, as well
as constant references to its voluntary nature, would be difficult to ignore as
a form of protest ('persistent objection') to the provisions of such documents
ever becoming a source of international law.
The prospects for the "maximalist position" look doubtful, either by way
of general international treaty or customary international law; but this
debate is likely to continue.
D. GENERAL PROSPECTS

It may well be that by the time a workable consensus has been reached
and an international control system--of whatever character-has been

"3Ibid, para. 88, at 493.
'Inter alia, Komiya, "Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations", United Nations
Publication E/5500/Rev.I:ST/ESA/6, New York, 1979, at 122; Seidl-Hohenveldern, "The
United Nations ahd Transnational Corporations", in SIMMONDS, ed., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1977), at 55.
6
See Baade, "Legal Effects of Codes", op. cit., supra note 35, at 20, 22.
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developed to where it can be effectively applied and enforced, that the
'threat' which generated it will have substantially diminished, or even
ceased to be a 'threat', as a natural consequence of the ever-changing global
economic landscape which is already displaying signs, in certain sectors, of
a distinct shift in direction. 66 There is, for example, an increasing tendency
toward contractual arrangements 67 as opposed to the traditional forms of
investment up to now characteristic of the MNE. This may already be an
indication of the legal effect of an ever-tightening clampdown, through regulatory legislation, on MNE direct-investment activity.
To sum up, the real obstruction to universally applicable international
legal controls is the general disparity between the various business and government interests globally represented, where cultural, political, economic
and ideological differences all combine to make harmony of purpose
among nations or economic groupings, in this regard, virtually unattainable
in a form which is to have a perceptible practical impact.
2. Nonlegal.spects
A. NON-LEGALLY-BINDING NATURE AS A POSSIBLE ASSET

Within code/guidelines discussions reigns the further debate as to
whether, in actual practice, the fact that such instruments are not legally
binding does not perhaps render them more effective than if they were
legally binding. A typical argument for this point of view is the benefit of
the greater flexibility and specificity resulting from the nonnecessity of the
international consensus required for a legally enforceable instrument.
While nonlegal aspects of the codes are not central to our treatment here, a
distorted picture could result if it were not pointed out that international
codes and guidelines, despite their lack of legal enforceability, have not
been without discernable and sometimes concrete effect.
"See e.g. "Auslandsinvestitionen in Amerika gestiegen", Frankfurter ,411gemeine Zeitung, 29
August 1980, at 12; "Foreign direct investment in Germany DM 66.8 b ende 1978", Europe
Agence internationale d'information pour la presse, Luxembourg, 4 February 1981, at 17; "The
new wave: Foreign capital investment in the United States-a survey", The Economist, 25
October 1980; "Deutsche Auslandsinvestitionen bzw. auslandische Investitionen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Archly der Gegenwart, 9 August 1980; CCH Common Market
Reporter. Doing Business in Europe, para. 40,033 [New Developments, 1980]; "Verstarkte
Kapitalausfuhr aus Japan: Direktinvestitionen im Ausland auf Rekordhohe", Neue Zarcher
Zeitung, 6 September 1979, at 17; "Japan is Building Economic Empire in American West",
International Herald Tribune, 3 August 1978, at I et seq.; "Japanese Beachhead in California",
The New York Times, Sunday edition, 21 August 1977, Section 3, at i; "Look out-the British
are coming", The Sunday Telegraph, 27 February 1977, at 25; "Beecham expanding in North
America", Financial Times, 9 March 1978 (Financial and Company News section).
"That contractual arrangements are increasingly being resorted to as a solution to the growing restrictions on MNE foreign direct investment was stressed by George C. Kern, Jr., in
private discussion, on the occasion of the June 1979 Cologne Conference on "The U.S. Antitrust Laws/Die U.S.-Antitrust-Gesetze," presented by the Practising Law Institute of New
York in co-operation with the German-American Lawyers Association, Bonn, the American
Chamber of Commerce in Germany, Frankfurt am Main, and the Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht E.V., Wiesbaden.
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B. TANGIBLE NONLEGAL EFFECTS

Of particular interest in this connection are two instances in which host
governments have brought before the OECD Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprise (CIME), for "clarification", cases
involving MNEs where the judgments handed down by local courts were
considered by those governments to be unacceptable and in conflict with
the 'letter' or at least the 'spirit' of the Guidelines.
In each case, specific action was consequently taken against the MNEs in
question-action which had not, in either case, been a part of the final judgment in the respective national courts. One of these cases was the Badger
case, 68 brought by the Belgian government, and the other was the Hertz
case, 69 brought by the Danish government, both introduced on March 30,
1977. The Badger case involved the issue of co-responsibility of the parent
company and its subsidiaries; the Hertz case involved the transfer of company personnel across national borders during a labour dispute. We shall
avoid entering into the detailed facts of these domestic cases, 70 since at the
stage at which they reached the international level their handling was extralegal. And while even the nonlegal aspects are interesting and worthy of
mention, the essential point to be brought out here is that these cases, called
to the attention of the CIME by host governments, are illustrations of issues
arising under voluntary Guidelines which produced concrete and favourable results for those host states introducing the complaints. The Committee strictly limits itself to considering and clarifying the issues only, i.e. the
general principles on which a debate was based, without any pretense of
acting as a 'semi-court'. The Committee seeks no deviation from the practice of settling actual cases, at the national or bilateral level, in domestic
courts. It carefully avoids any references to 'fact-finding'; it debates 'issues'
rather than 'cases'; and it aims at 'clarification' rather than 'interpretation'.
While a number of other cases have been brought before the CIME, all
introduced by one of its advisory bodies, namely the Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC), the Hertz and Badger cases are of particular interest
in that they were the first two cases brought before the Committee by
governments.
Of course OECD's CIME brings to mind also ICC's commercial arbitration service for conflicts arising in the course of international trade, as well
as the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Industrial
Disputes (ICSID), as international efforts to settle trade and investment
"The Badger case, Written Question No. 323/77 of June 29, 1977 (Mr. Van der Hek), and
the Answer of the Commission, dated September 14, 1977, OfticialJournal 1977 C. 246/17 and
18.
"The Hertz case, EC doc. 424/76, November 15, 1976; European Parliament, Resolution of
November 16, 1976, Official Journal 1976 C. 293/12; Debates, same date, at 46-51.
'For a more detailed handling of the Badger and Hertz cases, see BLANPAIN, THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS: 1976-1979. EXPE-

RIENCE AND REVIEW, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1979).
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conflicts; but we must not deviate from the central issue here, which is not
arbitration but MNE regulation, or control, and the nature of international
codes and guidelines.
3. Addressees
Every bit as significant for the effectiveness-legal or extralegal--of the
codes is the matter of to whom they are addressed. International codes or
regulations-however well elaborated-are of little impact when the recommendations are not directed at parties with the will and capacity to carry
them out effectively. Of prime importance, then, is that any international
directives be addressed to the appropriate party. This may, in fact, vary
according to the particular intent of any given set of guidelines.
It is noteworthy that, while the host state is the party most directly
affected by the foreign investment, most of the code provisions are directed
either at the home state (ICC Guidelines: "The Investor's Country
Should. . ."; ILO: "Governments of home countries should. . ."), or at
the MNEs themselves (OECD: "Enterprises should. . ., should refrain
from. . ."; ICC: "The Investor Should..."; ILO: "multinational enterprises should. . ."; U.N.: "Transnational corporations should/shall .. ,
should/shall not..."). ICC and the ILO have included directives to the
host as well (ICC: "The Host Country's Government Should..."; ILO:
"Both host and home country governments should. . ."), addressing some
provisions to two or to all three parties concerned (ILO: "All parties concerned . . . should...", "Governments, multinational as well as national
enterprises should..
Each major set of guidelines is constructed differently, reflecting the
slightly different natures or objectives. The OECD Guidelines address only
MNEs, and expressly state that they are to be regarded as "recommendations jointly addressed by Member countries to multinational enterprises
operating in their territories", and that "[o]bservation of the guidelines is
71
voluntary and not legally enforceable".
The ICC divides its "Principles" into three separate categories: (1) those
addressed to "The Investor", (2) those addressed to "The Investor's Country's Government", and (3) those addressed to "The Host Country's Government". These guidelines are also expressly stated not to be a "rigid code
72
of conduct".
The U.N. Code Formulations make it clear in the Preface 73 that the
treatment of principles and/or issues are divided into two groups, those
related to the activities of MNEs, and those relating to their treatment. This
would seem to imply that the addressees would be the MNEs on the one
"OECD Guidelines, op. cit., supra note 28, para. 6, at 12.
"See Baade, "Codes of Conduct", op. cit., supra note 29, at 53.
"United Nations (ECOSOC), "Transnational Corporations: Code of Conduct; Formulations by the Chairman", U.N. document E/C.10/AC.2/8, December 13, 1978 [hereinafter
cited as United Nations Code of Conduct: Formulations].
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hand, and host states on the other. On examination of the text of the Code
formulations, one finds that paragraphs 6 through 4674 are specifically
addressed to MNEs ("transnational corporations"); paragraphs 47-57 contain generally worded rights and responsibilities of host states and certain
guidelines on jurisdiction and dispute settlement; only paragraphs 59-66
directly address states, and none of these paragraphs contain the "should/
shall" formula used in addressing the MNEs. The alternative formulations
read: "States agree to/should. . .", or "States agree that. . .", and even
these are not necessarily host states. As mentioned earlier, the legal nature
of the Code has yet to be determined.
The ILO Declaration does not divide its provisions according to
addressee, but rather to subject matter. Consequently the addressees, representing government, employer and labour, are scattered throughout. The
subject headings are helpful, but it could perhaps be of greater utility to any
of the parties consulting the Declaration, if the various addressees were
likewise grouped together, to facilitate reference. The Declaration, as previously mentioned, is recognized to be nonmandatory.
Let us consider what relative effects can be expected from directives
addressed to the various parties concerned.
A. DIRECTIVES TO HOME GOVERNMENTS

First, in the present context, directives addressed to home governments
concerning their multinational enterprises abroad can easily lead to greater
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction or simply to further penetration of
foreign influence into host territory. This would surely aggravate rather
than alleviate many of the present concerns.
Secondly, if an international directive provides that the home state do the
regulating, the home state must apply uniform regulatory measures to every
type of firm, from extractive industries to high technotronics, unless a system of exceptions is to be implemented; and then the question arises as to
who determines those exceptions, the international body issuing the directives to the home states or the home states themselves, in which case international uniformity is immediately sacrificed and subjectivity reenters.
Moreover, and even more importantly if the home state is directed to do
the regulating, no differentiation can be made between various recipient
(host) states. Unless, again, some elaborate system of exceptions were
worked out relating to stage of economic development, balance of payments, GNP, or other criteria for assessing need for preferential treatment--criteria which fluctuate, in any case, even within a single state at
different times. And even if the international regulations were to be tripartite, in the sense that recognition of the substantial differences between
industrial, developing, and state-run economies were reflected in the regulations governing them, this would still fail to deal with the fact that the
"With the exception of the several not yet formulated.
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national interests even within each group also vary considerably from one
nation state to another (witness the frequent lack of unanimity within
regional 'common markets'7 5).
Such issues as what constitutes a 'key sector', or what particular technological, managerial, or other needs might be served by conditional entry
requirements, or what constitutes the 'national interest', and similar issues,
can only properly be determined by the individual nation-state hosting the
investment (in conformity with international law), and not by the home
state constrained to uniformly apply some internationally decreed standard,
which it must then exert extraterritorially on its MNEs operating abroad.
B. DIRECTIVES TO MNEs
International directives addressed to the MNEs are unquestionably useful in the form of guidelines for good corporate citizenship as binding
codes, however, they would be less than optimal for several reasons. First,
the multinational enterprises themselves are hit by national regulations
from both home and host governments. An international code aspiring to
further regulate the multinationals directly, rather than through governments, would only add to the multitude of regulations, often conflicting,
which already confront them, further aggravating international commercial
relations.
An international code could indeed contribute to the avoidance of overlapping or conflicting legislative jurisdiction to alleviate the unenviable
position of the MNE being subject to more than one jurisdiction when multiple jurisdiction means conflicting and mutually incompatible directives;
but international directives addressed to MNEs can clearly do nothing to
ameliorate such conditions, as the MNEs themselves are powerless as
regards jurisdictional questions, being neither general 'natural' nor 'artificial' subjects of international law as currently understood, 76 nor possessing
77
"the power to participate directly in the norm-creating process."
Further, addressing directives to the MNEs fails to take full account of
the semantic and definitional deficiencies. The difficulties of definition of a
multinational enterprise are well-known and no universally accepted legal
definition of MNEs exists as yet. It is clear, then, that provisions aimed at
"multinational enterprises" may fall short of their mark if it remains
unclear as to just which enterprises fall under the category of
"multinational".
The OECD Guidelines state specifically that "a precise legal definition is
'5See, inter alia, Vagts, "The Host Country Faces the Multinational Enterprise", 53 B. U.L.
REV., (1973), at 276; "Chile Formally Quits Andean Market Pact", InternationalHerald Trib-

une, November 1, 1976; Torem and Craig, "Developments in the Control of Foreign Investment in France", 70 MICH. L. REV., (1971), at 300-311.
"See generally Baade, "Individual Responsibility", in: Black and Falk, eds., The Futureof
the International Legal Order, Vol. 4: The Structure of the International Environment,
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970 [Vol. 4, 19721 pp. 290-327.
"Baade, "Legal Effects of Codes", op. cit., supra note 35, at 16.
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not required for the purpose of the guidelines". 78 This is true only due to
the totally voluntary nature of these particular Guidelines, and their "softlaw" character. In contrast to this, and reflecting the legal aspirations of the
U.N. Code, is the statement that "[t]he need to define transnational corporations as well as some other fundamental concepts for the purposes of a
code is recognized". 79 If a code is to be binding, a legal-or at least authoritative--definition is clearly called for, in order to identify the entities to be
covered.80
But even a precise definition does not provide an adequate solution. Provided a legal definition were arrived at-and one such definition was
indeed formulated independently by the Institut de Droit International at
its Oslo Session in 19778'-an interprise operating internationally and
wishing to avoid certain provisions of the Code could, if it were in its interest, so modify its operations as to fall just outside of the legal definition and
thus outside of the reach of the regulations. Such a move is unlikely with a
large and well established multinational concern, but an enterprise just
hovering on the borderline of becoming "multinational" by definition,
could be tempted in this direction.
C. DIRECTIVES TO HOST GOVERNMENTS

This leads us to another significant question, namely, how important is it
that a multinational firm be distinguished from a national firm for the purpose of regulation? It has been suggested that: "The so-called tensions
between nation-states and multinational corporations are not very often different from those confronting government and business in the normal
' 82
course of their mutual relations."
It is true that certain control provisions could only relate to enterprises
with a foreign control-center. Such provisions would include the protection
of national security and key-sector areas. But are not many of the abuses
which are named as MNE abuses just as apt to be perpetrated by a powerful domestic firm?
"OECD Guidelines, op. cit., supra note 28, para. 7, at 12.
'"U.N. document E/C.10/AC.2/3, January 26, 1978, para. 24, at 10. For full title of document, see supra note 3.
'See e.g. United Nations, TransnationalCorporations.- Issues Involved in the Formulationof

a Code of Conduct, U.N. document E/C.10/18, para. 46.
" Les entreprises formees d'un centre de decision localist dans un pays et de centres
d'activit6, dotes ou non de personnalite juridique propre, situes dans un ou plusieurs autres
pays, devraient etre consid~r6es comme constituant, en droit, des entreprises multination-

ales.
Institut de Droit International, "R~solutions adoptkes par l'Institut A la Session d'Oslo, 30
aoft-8 septembre 1977: III. Les entreprises multinationales" (Deuxitme Commission), (the
French text is authoritative), as reproduced in Institut de Droit International: Annuaire, Vol.

57, Tome II, pp. 338-342, Sect. I, at 341.
":Rogers, "'MultinationalCorporations:A European View", in

ed., 403 THE
(1972), at 65.
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A small MNE (and there are small MNEs, unless the definition one
selects includes a certain minimum size standard, which is not a very realistic criterion for establishing multinationality) is not likely to receive much
criticism. It is generally a powerful MNE which becomes subject to attack.
Is not a large and powerful domestic firm equally prone to exert undue
pressures on its own government, lobby for its particular interests, which
are not necessarily those of its government, or otherwise abuse the consumer by unfair competition and restrictive business practices? In the opinion of the present writer, it is the abuses themselves which should be
attacked, whatever entity commits them, national or multinational;8 3 and
the host state would seem in the best position to assess those activities which
are 'abusive' in the context of its own individual economy. Moreover, the
very words "national interest" and "foreign enterprise" lose substantial significance outside of the national context.
If some potential abuses are exclusive to multinational activity, then of
course a law may be enacted to curb that abuse, but that law should be
enacted by the host state where the abuse is likely to occur. There would
appear to be no need to specify that the law is to be applied exclusively to
multinational firms, as then the definitional problem arises. The law should
simply be directed against the abuse. Firms which by their very legal structure are incapable of perpetrating the abuse will simply lie outside the
applicability of the particular law.
Special care must of course be taken here, in conformity with the
national treatment principle of international law, that the law is not of a
discriminatory nature, and that, if it affects solely foreign enterprises, it is
only in those allowed areas of the public interest and national security.
There is clearly the danger, even so, that the 'public interest' can be
stretched beyond all reasonable limits, as is not infrequently seen in, for
example, some cases relating to expropriation.
In short, it should not be "the multinational enterprise" which is under
attack, but rather those results of operations--of MNEs or of strictly
national enterprises-which have deleterious effects on the political, economic, cultural and/or natural environments. It is in the context of functioning national legal systems where this will hopefully be-and appears to
be in the process of being-partially, if not substantially, achieved.
Consequently, it is the opinion of the present writer that any MNE-control regulations8 4 in international codes, where the intent is any more than
one of "guidance" in the strictest sense of the word, should consist mainly
of directives to host governments to the end of harmonizing and rationalizing national legislation for controlling any abuses of power in corporate
"Two international codes reflect this view: the OECD Guidelines (op. cit., supra note 29,
para. 9.) and the ILO Declaration (op. cit., supra note 1, para. 11).
'As distinct from control limitations on the powers of host states in dealing with MNEs as
aliens, which should also be included in any regulations regarding MNEs. See also infra note
105 and accompanying text.
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activity; and where this involves a foreign multinational enterprise, the control is best applied at its point of impact, its point of actual operations,
namely, the host state. For if the aim is to be served of making the MNE
both efficiently productive and economically and technologically beneficial
to the host state, surely a 'conflicting patchwork' of national controls will
not serve this goal.85 What is needed is a legal framework of effective
national laws harmonized at least to an extent that companies can more
easily initiate and conduct transnational operations8 6 without the uncertainty and complexities of conflicting laws, and with the more stable environment for long-range and beneficial corporate planning that such a
87
framework would provide.
Finally, the fact that the current trend is toward polycentric (host-country
oriented) 88 management is another strong argument in favour of control
being exercised by the host, in its capacity as not only the seat of operations,
but, increasingly, the seat of management.
International guidelines addressed to the host states, then, (and it must
not be forgotten that most industrialized host states are at the same time
home states, but here we are concentrating on their capacity as host) would
place the control at the locus of the potentially abusive act. Moreover, the
enforcement and/or punitive machinery relating to the abuse-or at least to
the local party to the abuse in cases where two or more different national
units of a multinational enterprise are involved-would also be at the locus
of the illegal act or abuse.
Support for this view from an international body is supplied by a Resolution of the Institut de Droit International at its Oslo Session in 1977,89 in
which it was stipulated that for those enterprises which conform to the Resolution's 'legal' definition of "entreprises multinationales", 90 "[ill convient
que soit progressivement elabor6 un regime juridique. . . qu'il devrait en
particulier sauvegarder la souverainet6 et l'ind~pendance 6conomique des
Etats. ."91 While the recommendation that such judicial regime be
implemented through international agreements, 92 and that a study on the
introduction of an international registration of multinational enterprises be
"See e.g. Tindall, op. cit., supra note 49, at 191-192.
"See TUGENDHAT, THE MULTINATIONALS (New York: Random House, 1972), at 91-92.
"See Tindall, op. cit., supra note 49, at 228-229.
"See Perlmutter, "Some Architectural Problems ofthe MultinationalFirm," 3 Q. J.AISEC
INT. (1967), cited in Yearbook of InternationalOrganizations, 1968-1969, at 140; cf. also Perlmutter, "The Tortuous Evolution of Multinational Corporations", 3 COL. J. WORLD Bus. (1969)
and Perlmutter, "L'entrepriseinternationale--roisconceptions", 23 REV. P-CON. Soc. (1965), at
151 et seq.
" Institut de Droit International, "Resolutions adopt6es par l'Institut a laSession d'Oslo, 30
ao0t-8 septembre 1977: III. Less entreprises multinationales" (Deuxieme Commission), (the
French text is authoritative), as reproduced in Institut de Droit International. Annuaire, Vol.
57, Tome II, pp. 338-342.
'Ibid, Sect. I. (See supra note 81).
"Ibid, Sect. II.
91bid, Sect. III: 1(a).
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undertaken, 9 3 the emphasis remains on safeguarding the sovereignty and
94
economic independence of states.
Further, the resolution provides that:
1. Pour la determination de la loi applicable Ala constitution, Arorganisation,
au fonctionnement et Al'activit6 des divers 6lments composant l'entreprise multinationale, il doit etre fait respectivement application des syst~mes de solution de
conflits de chaque for saisi. En ce qui concerne les activit~s des entreprises multinationales, il serait souhaitable que ces systemes fussent progressivement
harmonis~s de mani~re Atenir compte, d'abord du pays oi s'accomplissent ces
activit~s, et en outre des pays ou celles-ci produisent des effets directs et
imm6diats.
2. I1est souhaitable que soit envisag~e une harmonisation internationale progressive des r~gles de droit materiel relatives aux activit~s des entreprises multinationales, et que soient poursuivis
les travaux d'61aboration de 'Codes de
95
conduite' pour ces entreprises.
Hence, while promoting "codes of conduct" for multinational enterprises,
the general thrust of the resolution appears to be toward a "progressive
international harmonization" within the choice of law system of each
forum, wherein will be determined the law applicable as concerns MNE
activities, "preserving the sovereignty and economic independence of
states", rather than toward an actual globally applicable international regulatory agreement.
And finally, while recommending that international agreements be concluded for allocation of jurisdiction in matters of restrictive business practices in order to avoid overlapping jurisdiction or jurisdictional gaps, actual
legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction (to regulate, control and
penalize in cases where the effects of such practices are of "an intentional
character, or at least foreseeable, substantial, direct and immediate"), are to
be based-at least in every case concerning restrictive business practiceson the locus where the delict is performed ("fondfe en tout cas sur le lieu otk
ces pratiques sont accomplies") and where its "direct and immediate
96
effects" are felt.
While considering the host as addressee, it would be well to make at least
a passing comment on host-state limitations. No international code can
achieve the aims sought unless it represents a reasonable balance of advantages and responsibilities for governments and corporations alike. 97 Without continually recalling to mind that the present discussion has been
focused upon control techniques exercised over the activities of multinational enterprises, one could easily develop the notion that a sort of 'cops
and robbers' situation exists, where the 'good guys' are the regulating gov"Ibid, Sect. III: 2(a).
"Ibid, Sect. II.
"Ibid, Sect. IV: 1,2.
Ibid, Sects. V, VI.
"See Jenks, "MAulinational Entities in the Law of Nations", in JFssup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY; Essays, Friedmann, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), at 81-82.
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ernments and the 'bad guys' are invariably the MNEs.98 A very timely and
useful study could be made concurrently on the extent to which the host
states or other regulators should be limited or restrained from executing
and exercising undue, excessive or unjustified 'controls' over the MNEs. In
other words, who is to control the controllers?9 9
Here, we are led into another realm of discussion entirely-that of protection of the foreign MNE investment against host-state coercive action
which is not in conformity with the rules of international law. The delimitations of the present article have committed us to a consideration only of
control over the MNE, and do not expand to include limitations on that
control. If mention of the other side of the coin is totally neglected, however, an incomplete and deceptive impression could result.
We would do well to state here the aim of 'controls', which is generally
agreed to be to minimize the detrimental effects and maximize the beneficial effects of MNE activity. This aim is a feature of every major 'code',
'guideline', and 'declaration' on international MNE controls drafted in
recent years. o0 The second element of this aim will not be achieved if all
'controls' relating to the MNE are unidirectional and end up by strangling
such enterprises to the point where their beneficial contribution to economic rationalization and development are sacrificed.
Apropos, a 200-page report, with a further 200-page annex, has recently
been published in Brussels," °" revealing that multinationals are far more
circumscribed by national, regional, and international regulations than they
were even a few years previous. The report details the plethora of both
international and purely EEC controls that have gradually and imperceptibly begun to restrict the freedom of action of the MNEs. Citing, inter alia,
the EEC's fourth directive, requiring standards of disclosure on MNEs'
subsidiaries; its seventh directive, aimed at demanding consolidated
accounts from the MNEs; and its ninth directive creating a new legal basis
for group liability of MNEs, the report warns that "it is the array of powers
that the EEC Commission either possesses now or plans to acquire that
stands out as the most formidable weapon multinationals have to face if
10 2
they operate inside the Common Market."'
As observed in a review of the report: "In effect, the multinational corporation is being tied down by strands of regulation, just as Gulliver was
10 3
immobilised by the Lilliputians."'
"See e.g. "Multinationals: Bad guys do good" (ILO studies resulting in support for MNEs),
The Economist, November 22, 1975, at 81.
"See e.g. Schaffner, Die Multinationalen-Ausbeuter oder Triebkrafi der Weltwirischaft?

(Ztrich, Edition Interfrom, 1974), at 23.
'"See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
'' "Multinationals in the 1980s-trends in European regulation and international control",
Agence Europ~en d'informations, Brussels, 1980.
""'The EEC creeps up on the multinationals" (Merritt), The Financial Times, London,
October 5, 1979, at 12, reviewing the Brussels report (Idem).
103Idem.
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A similar type of metaphor was used by Thomas Enders, the then U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, before members of Congress and the European
Parliament, when he remarked that: "the danger is that uncoordinated or
excessive national and international regulation-particularly if aimed at
potential rather than actual abuses-runs the risk of killing the goose which
lays the golden egg." 1°
In considering international controls as a subject in themselves, one
would really have to contemplate to what extent such controls should be
seen as additional regulations on the MNE, already controlled from every
side nationally; and conversely, to what extent they should be used to protect the interests of the multinational enterprises themselves' 0 5 and to ease
the many and various complexities confronting an enterprise doing business
internationally.
C. Function of International Codes and Guidelines
A certain amount of caution must be exercised in attempting to appraise
what are properly national functions and what are more suitably international functions in regulating the MNE, 1°6 since the multinational enterprise has been perceived as a political as well as an economic phenomenon,
and legal 'answers' and categorizations cannot be expected to eliminate all
the political repercussions stemming from MNE activity. Some evaluation
as to the function of MNE-related controls can nonetheless be made.
1. Protection of Beneficial Free-Flow of Private Investment Capital and
Maintenance of Proper Balance of Benefits to MNE and Host
Respectively

Control on the national level simply means that the regulation of private
enterprise should be a function of the individual nation-state in an exercise
of its national sovereignty in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law and in the interests of preserving the free movement of private investment capital which has, up to now, (notwithstanding
some well-publicized instances of abuse) been largely responsible for positive economic development and technological advancement on a global
'Statement of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State, at a public hearing on the
multinational corporation held jointly by members of Congress and the European Parilament,
September 17, 1974, as cited in Sparkman, "The MNC and Foreign Investment", 27 MERCER
L. REV. (1976) at 385.
'Little rationalized protection for MNEs exists, outside of foreign investment insurance
schemes and access to certain international arbitral tribunals such as IBRD's International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). One notable effort at such protection is the Council-of-Europe-approved OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property, 1967 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the Council on the Draft Convention,
OECD Publication No. 23081 (November 1967).
"6M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY IN EUROPE, SOME KEY
PROBLEMS (London: Longman, 1972), at 109.
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basis. As assumed up by one legal writer, "[tihe free flow of capital and
technology, as well as the free exchange of goods, is believed to result in a
more efficient allocation of the world's resources and an improvement in
07
world economic welfare."'
Another legal writer goes so far as to state that "the advancement of
aggregate global well-being depends, at least in part, upon an abundant flow
of private foreign capital, which in turn depends upon stability of normative expectations. . ." [emphasis supplied], 08 while at the same time
admitting that "it cannot be assumed that all such wealth will contribute to
global well-being. Arguably only that foreign wealth which from economic, ecological, and other relevant points of view produces a net benefit
to host countries is going to assist in this way. The fact remains, however,
that worldwide economic growth cannot do without private foreign trade
and investment." 1 09
This is not uniquely an industrialized nation point of view. From the
Dlsseldorf Conference,"10 where the developing world was also represented, the following conclusion emerged:
It was universally acknowledged (at the Conference) that foreign investment is
still vital to the process of development and structural transformation in the
developing world in order to provide capital, particularly high-risk capital as in
natural resource exploration, to provide technology and to give access to the
knowledge of international markets. I" I
In sum, "[t]he free play of economic forces will, apart from a few exceptional cases, make the economic welfare of the whole world greater in the
long run than any alternate arrangement of resources". 1 12
Hence, one function of regulations should be to protect the beneficial
free-flow of private investment capital, and to maintain a proper balance
between the benefits to the enterprise and those to the host state, cutting
down on known abuses, through national legislation.
As remarked earlier, needs will vary not only from general economic sector to general economic sector, i.e. regionally, and not only from state to
state within one economic sector or region, i.e. nationally, but also within
one particular state at different stages in its political and economic development. For example, certain sectors of the economy are liable to close and
reopen to foreign investors as the host state concerned experiences various
temporary political or economic crises.' 13 These regional and national dis'Ellis, "United States MultinationalCorporations.- The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
on United States Foreign Relations," I I SAN DIEGO L. REV. (1973), at 3.
"'Weston, "'Constructive Takings' under InternationalLaw A Modest Foray into the Problem of 'Creeping Expropriation'", 16 VIRO. J. INT. L. (1975), at 124.
"'Vbid, at 127.
"'See supra, Section B(l)(b).
'Stern, in Wallace, loc. cit., supra note 45.
" 2 Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (Cambridge: James Nisbet and Co. &
Cambridge University Press, 1958), at 141.
"'BROOKE AND REMMERS, THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM: A STUDY OF MANAGEMENT ACROSS

FRONTIERS-TRADE AND INVESTMENT

(London: Pitman, 1977), at 60. A case in point would
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crepancies and internal fluctuations can be reflected in regional and municipal legislation in a way that would be impossible under an international
system, and this freedom must be maintained for the sake not only of
national economic well-being, but also of the healthy international flow of
capital worldwide.
2. Harmonizationof NationalLaws in Certain Key Areas
A second function of international 'codes' or 'guidelines' should be one
that we have spoken of throughout and that needs little further elaboration
here-that of harmonizing national laws in the key areas of control over
foreign direct investment, with allowance for diversities in regional and
national needs and objectives. Some key areas for such harmonization
would be, for example, certain aspects of antitrust legislation and its extraterritorial reach," 14 laws regarding illicit payments and other corrupt business practices, 1 5 and certain standards such as compensation in
constructive takings of alien property; while areas left more to domestic
prerogative would include controls on entry, key sector exclusions, reasonable tax incentives and disincentives, and other means of ensuring and safeguarding internal economic well-being and national security.
3. Coverage of Those Areas InadequatelyProvidedfor under Municipal
Law

A third function of any international guidelines should be to cover those
areas for which existing municipal systems are unable to provide adequately, either because such areas are beyond their jurisdictional mandate
or because they are powerless to provide effective harmonization efforts for
unifying their own transborder commercial transactions with those of other
nation-states. Among these might figure even some of those areas mentioned in the above paragraph, in cases where no laws yet exist to be 'harmonized' or where national standards are so diverse as to preclude any
internationally recognizable norm-for example directives regarding compensation standards or illicit payments.
Some international support for binding codes or multilateral treaties in
the area of corrupt practices can already be observed in association with
be the U.K. automobile manufacturing firm British Leyland's negotiations with Japanese car
manufacturers to produce Japanese cars in the U.K. This would have been unthinkable ten
years earlier.
"'See e.g. OECD Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices:
"Restrictive Business Practices of Multinational Enterprises", OECD, Paris, 1977, at 58. Bilat-

eral and multilateral agreements such as that between Germany and the United States in antitrust matters could also be a positive means of harmonization as well as having the binding
force of the international law of treaties.
"'See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
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certain of the code formulations; 1 6 and the U.N. Economic and Social
Council is, itself, working on the elaboration of an international agreement
on illicit payments."17 Yet it is largely illusory to issue a guideline
instructing multinational enterprises not to make illicit payments, when the
MNE is operating in a host state where government officials openly or
clandestinely exact such payments, or in host states where such payments
would constitute the traditional and accepted way of conducting business.
The MNEs would be the first to benefit from controls in this area. Such
control cannot emanate from MNEs but must be exercised rather by governments, which have the power to penalize any breaches of the law.
Unfortunately, in some countries it is the government that encourages these
practices.
It is not even sufficient that home governments make such payments illegal for their own multinationals operating abroad, unless all home governments enact-and enforce--such legislation. This is where the importance
of harmonization of laws becomes particularly apparent. To date, for
example, only the United States has made it a criminal offense for its enter8
prises to offer illicit payments in their business transactions abroad."
Since no European or other nations have followed suit, U.S. firms have
been put at an obvious and costly competitive disadvantage vis-d-vis other
foreign investors who continue to do business according to the means customarily expected of them in states which turn a blind eye to, or actively
indulge in, such practices.
So here again, while an international code would be useful for promoting
a uniform international standard, it is to the host governments that international directives should be issued to the effect that no illicit payments are to
be either exacted or accepted from foreign investors.
Illicit payments is indeed one area in which a general treaty could alleviate some of the difficulties. Other areas might include accounting procedures and some aspects of restrictive business practices touching on
extraterritoriality questions. Even so, if the provisions are not adequately
enforced on the national level, nearest the source of the difficulties, or if
they merely duplicate what is already covered by municipal legislation,
international solutions will be no improvement on national ones.
4. Overall Function
The overall function of international as well as of national control legislation, as concerns the MNE, then, should be-to use the wording of the
..See e.g. International Chamber of Commerce, "Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions", Report adopted by the 131st Session of the Council of the ICC, November 29, 1977,
Part II, Recommendations to Governments, Sect. I.
"'United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Committee on an International
Agreement on Illicit Payments on its First and Second Sessions (January 29-February 9 and
May 7-18, 1979), U.N. document E/1979/104 of May 25, 1979.
"United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 95th Cong.
(December 19, 1977) [S. 305].
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OECD Guidelines-to "encourage the positive contributions which multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimise and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give
rise."'

19

This statement, moderately rephrased in both the U.N. Code 20 and iLO
Declaration,' 2 1 expresses the general recognition that along with whatever
difficulties may arise from MNE operations, there is also a positive contribution resulting from these activities.' 22 It should then be up to the individual state, in whose interest it is, after all, that any abuses arising out of
MNE or other corporate activity be curbed and that any benefits arising
therefrom be put to suitable advantage, to determine how best to accomplish its goals, in conformity with international law and taking into consideration all relevant international guidelines. Outside of directives aimed at
a general harmonization of national laws, a code of conduct or international set of guidelines should fulfill only that function which cannot better
be filled on the national level. It should complement and direct, not replace
or override, national regulations. The task of "international" MNE regulation then, in sum, is to maximize the benefits to the largest possible extent,
and to minimize the difficulties to the greatest possible degree, by retaining
to the individual states their sovereign powers and rights to protect their
national interests, while allowing multinational business enterprises to
manage their operations in a way that will maximize overall effectiveness in
conformity with, and consistent with, their duties as responsible 'corporate
citizens' and as responsible subjects of both municipal and international
law.

"'OECD Guidelines, op. cit., supra note 28, para. 2, at 1I. Cf. OECD Declaration, op. cit.,
supra note 26, Secretary-General's Foreword to the Declaration (unnumbered) para. 1, at 5.
' 2°United Nations Code of Conduct: Formulations, op. cit., upra note 73, para. 57, at 13.
See also U.N. Draft Code, op. cit., supra note 4, para. 60.
1ILO Declaration, op. cit., supra note 1, Preface (unnumbered) para. 4, and para. 2.
'The adherence to this statement on the part of the ILO would not appear to be merely for
propaganda purposes, as evidenced by the published results of ILO studies carried out on the
operations of MNEs, which resulted in some positive findings. (See, supra note 98.)

